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How the Elephant Lost His Tusks
Andrew J. Heimert
"'When we are hungry, elephants are food. When we are full,
elephants are beautiful.""
The elephant is surely one of the most widely liked animals. Despite this
general popularity, the number of African elephants has declined significantly
in recent years. This Note explores two alternative strategies that African
nations have employed in their attempts to halt the decline of elephant
populations. Each strategy is an effort to restrict access to the proverbial
"commons." One method, used in Kenya, attempts to maintain elephant
populations by ensuring absolute protection from poachers and by banning all
trade in elephants. The other approach, used primarily in southern
Africa-including Zimbabwe and South Africa-actively manages elephant
populations, culling some animals in order to provide sufficient habitat and
protection for the remaining ones. The southern African countries share
proceeds earned from wildlife with local people, in effect creating a form of
property rights in elephants. This Note argues that the current international ban
on ivory trade harms the latter kind of program, which has been more effective
at protecting elephants.
Poaching and habitat destruction as a result of human encroachment are
the two primary threats to the elephant.2 These twin forces have reduced
African elephant3 populations from an estimated 1,300,000 in 1979 to 609,000
in 1989.4 This Note assumes that there is, and will continue to be, an
1. Edward R. Ricciuti, The Elephant. WILDUFE CONSERVATION. Mar.-Apr 1993. at 14. 19 (quoting
Zimbabwean farmer).
2. See RAYMOND BONNER. AT THE HAND OF MAN 265 (1993) ("The reality of Africa is the expanding
human populations, with the attendant pressures on land."); Michael J. Glennon. Has International Law
Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1. 2 (1990); Tom Opre. Using Africa's lildlife Only Way To
Save It, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 5. 1989, at 4E ("Africa's biggest single problem is a human population
growing at a rate nearly unsurpassed elsewhere in the world."); Ricciut. supra note 1. at 18 ("[Elephants'l
range has been constricted and fragmented, mainly due to people and their enterprises.-)
3. The subject of this Note is Loxodonta afncana, the African elephant. The Asian elephant. Elephas
maximus, is not considered herein. Technically, there are two subspecies of Laxodonta africana: La.
africana, the bush and savannah elephant, and La. cyclotis. the forest elephant. See Lee J T White. The
Other African Elephant, WILDUFE CONSERVATION. Mar.-Apr. 1993. at 50. 51
4. David Concar & Mary Cole, Conservation and the Ivory Tower. NEW SCIEN,-rsT. Feb. 29. 1992.
at 29, 30. Other estimates differ. See. e.g.. BONNER. supra note 2. at 89. 92 (repoting population decrease
from one million in 1981 to 700,000 by 1988). Elephant population statistics are not particularly reliable.
See generally JONATHAN S. ADAMS & THOMAS 0. MCSHANE, TIHE MYrt OF WILD AFRICA 74 (1992)
(discussing difficulties of counting elephant populations).
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economic value for elephants, both from tourism as well as from tusks, hides,
and meat. A demand for elephant products creates an economic value for those
products,5 which in turn leads to trade in those products. A substantial amount
of illegal animal trade currently exists6 and is unlikely to dissipate. Therefore,
it is unlikely that an international trade ban, such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
7
will stem the flow of such products to parts of the world where demand still
exists! The removal of hide and tusks necessitates killing the elephant,9 but
elephants would be killed even without the demand for elephant products.
Because elephants are a danger and a nuisance to farmers and families, they
are often viewed as pests to be exterminated. These sentiments clearly conflict
with the desire for live elephants for tourism, other utilitarian goals, or moral
reasons. 1
0
5. David S. Favre, Debate Within the CITES Community: What Direction for the Future?, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 875, 888 (1993) ("The retail demand creates economic value for wildlife-alive, dead or as
products-and therefore creates an incentive for illegal activity.").
6. John H. Cushman, Jr., World Group To Debate Plan To Protect Species by Numbers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 1994, § 1, at 44 (reporting estimated $5 billion annual illegal trade in endangered species); Favre,
supra note 5, at 888 (noting estimates of $100 million worth of animals and plants illegally smuggled
annually into United States).
7. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened
for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; see infra part I.A.
8. Alastair Bradstock, Elephant Saviours in Ivory Towers, GEOGRAPHICAL MAG., Dec. 1990, at 14,
14 ('"he ban's success rests on the assumption that by stopping the trade the demand for ivory will
decline."). This demand, however, is unlikely to disappear. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 52 (noting
increasing demand in Japan for ivory, because of increased wealth and desire to obtain status symbols);
DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES 140 (1989) ("[I1n several cultures ivory
has long been in demand for medical, fertility or religious purposes."); Bradstock, supra, at 14 (noting
United Nations report suggesting too great investment in ivory business for demand to disappear); cf.
DEREK WILSON & PETER AYERST, WHITE GOLD 177 (1976) (noting that ivory, like precious metals and
gems, acts as hedge against inflation); Favre, supra note 5, at 888 ("There are [those] who have a desire
to possess the unique, and many do not care whether they obtain the items legally or illegally.").
David Harland says that the ivory trade ban effectively eliminated American and European demand
for ivory, but posits that Asian countries continue to demand ivory, primarily because they are relatively
unconcerned about wildlife conservation. DAVID HARLAND, KILLING GAME: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
AFRICAN ELEPHANT 54 (1994). He also presents statistics suggesting that it is most critical to stop demand
in Asia, because Asia is responsible for 88% of global consumption of raw ivory. Id. at 36.
9. "The only practical way of removing ivory from an elephant is by killing it." HARLAND, supra note
8, at 21. Even if one were able to take the ivory from an elephant without killing it, elephants need their
tusks for survival. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 106 (noting that elephants use their tusks to glean food
from trees); CYNTHIA Moss, ELEPHANT MEMORIES: THIRTEEN YEARS IN THE LIFE OF AN ELEPHANT
FAMILY 291 (1988) (noting that elephants use tusks "for feeding, digging, poking, playing and fighting");
Ricciuti, supra note I, at 21 ("Tusks are indispensable-and are used to dig up roots, untangle tree
branches, and drill dry riverbeds for water. They are also used as weapons, in display, and as 'bumpers'
for the elephant's trunk."). Elephants grow only one set of tusks in a lifetime. HARLAND, supra note 8, at
21.
10. This Note does not explore exhaustively the morality of the different programs; nevertheless, there
are important ethical concerns. One of the objections to active management (also known as sustainable
utilization) is that it requires killing individual animals, even if it does protect the species. This argument
involves debates about whether individual animals have rights that humans must recognize, or whether it
is the species that has a right to survival. Favre poses the critical question, which is whether elephants have
their own interests as social animals or whether they are "merely large turnips, to be harvested and
consumed." Favre, supra note 5, at 880. Because of the absence of a consensus on the moral issue and the
insufficiency of funds to protect elephants, this Note focuses on how best to protect as large a population
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In recent years, much of the debate over the elephant has focused on the
level of protection international law will extend to the species. The
development of international law to protect the elephant, and the structure of
CITES in particular, is examined in Part I of this Note. Part II describes the
method that Zimbabwe and South Africa have used in attempts to preserve
their elephant stocks and contrasts those schemes with the method used in
Kenya. The Note then examines the results each country has achieved in recent
years and suggests that the southern African active management programs have
been more effective.
Numerous scholars have described multitudinous variations on commons
problems. Part III applies the theoretical "commons" model to the elephant.
This Part analogizes the elephant to marine and other natural resources and
uses solutions to standard commons problems to explain the relative efficacy
of Zimbabwe's active management policy for elephants. Part IV illustrates that
a democratic government better fosters preservation of elephants through
electoral incentives than does an undemocratic government. A democratic
government is less likely to be corrupt than an undemocratic government, and
so is less likely to allow poaching to continue. Despite similarities between
South Africa's and Kenya's management programs, because South Africa's
government has faced more electoral competition than Kenya's government,
South Africa has avoided the adverse effects that corruption has had on
Kenya's elephant population.
Part V addresses the results of other bans on trade in wildlife and draws
parallels to the ban on trade in elephant products. In particular, the strict
limitations on trade in leopard skins illustrate the possibility of a manageable
system of limited trade in valuable animal parts. This Part concludes that
limited trade in ivory could successfully be reopened, particularly in light of
recent ivory identification processes.
I. THE TREATMENT OF THE ELEPHANT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The declining population of numerous species of wildlife in recent decades
has drawn much international attention. To address this problem, several
nations, including the United States, created CITES." CITES became
effective on July 1, 1975, and has since been joined by at least 122 nations.' 2
The agreement's general purpose is to save plants and animals that are
becoming extinct from overexploitation as a result of international trade. 3
of elephants as is affordable.
11. CITES, supra note 7.
12. See Cushman, supra note 6, at 44.
13. See CITES, supra note 7, pmbl.. 27 U.S.T. at 1090. 993 U.N.T.S. at 244
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A. The Structure of CITES
CITES divides species into tiers of protection based on the degree to
which they are threatened with extinction.' 4 A species may be listed in one
of three appendices. Appendix I includes "all species threatened with extinction
which are or may be affected by trade."' 5 Appendix I comprises animals that
require regulation in their trade to avoid becoming endangered.' 6 When a
nation deems a species' survival within its own borders to be in jeopardy, it
may enlist international cooperation by placing the species on Appendix IlY1
The Convention requires different levels of protection by mandating trade
restrictions for species in each of the appendices.' 8 In order to trade species
listed in Appendix I, both the importing and exporting nations must issue a
permit for a specific transaction.' 9 The permit signifies that both trading states
have determined that the import or export is not "detrimental to the survival
of the species involved. 20 The importing country must also determine that
the specimen "is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.,, 21 Even
trade that does not affect the survival of the species is often prohibited. For
example, trade of hides from endangered animals that have died of natural
causes is unlawful.22 The overall goal is to subject species listed on Appendix
I to "particularly strict regulation" 23 and thereby effectively eliminate trade
in those animal products.
24
14. See id. art. H, paras. 1-3, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245-46.
15. Id. art. II, para. 1, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. Trade in the animal and its derivative
products is prohibited. Id. art. I, cl. b(ii), 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
16. Id. art. H, para. 2, cl. a, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
17. Id. art. H, para. 3, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. Under Appendix 111, trade is restricted
only with the country that has deemed its own population of a species to be endangered. FAVRE, supra note
8, at 140.
18. CITES, supra note 7, art. I, cl. b(i)-(ii), 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245 (defining
"specimen" as any animal or plant, dead or alive, and any "recognizable part or derivative thereof"). This
Note uses the term "trade in the species" to include all trade involving products made from the species, not
just live specimens.
19. Id. art. Il, paras. 2-3, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
20. Id.
21. Id. art. II, para. 3, cl. c, 27 U.S.T. at 1094, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. This does not prohibit all
transactions that involve money. For example, a research institute might purchase a live specimen from
another country, subject to the other requirements of CITES. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 82. Zoo purchases
have presented a conundrum, because there is often a mixed purpose of scientific inquiry and profiteering
from the exhibition of rare animals. To counter potential objections, some of the additional profits from
the display of such animals, like the panda, may be used to further the survival of the species. Id. at 85-86.
22. The ban theoretically eliminates the incentive for humans to induce premature elephant deaths by
failing to provide adequate habitat, or through other indirect methods. Advocates of the ban suggest that
it would be difficult to distinguish between legitimate trade and illegitimate trade, and argue that to permit
any trade would allow illegal trade to continue. BONNER, supra note 2, at 147. The complete commercial
trade ban was implemented in part to counter anticipated political and economic pressure on governments
that would jeopardize a partial ban. Favre, supra note 5, at 906-07. This problem might be cured by some
form of marking system. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51, 255.
23. CITES, supra note 7, art. H, para. 1, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
24. Glennon, supra note 2, at 11.
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Appendix II provides a lower level of protection than Appendix I, allowing
regulated commercial trade in the species listed therein. "5 To import a species,
only an export permit from the exporting country's scientific authority is
required. 26 Trade in Appendix II species is monitored by parties to CITES in
order to ensure that sufficient numbers of a species remain in their habitat, and
to decide if an Appendix I listing might be more appropriate. 7 Appendix 1H
permits commercial trade in animals to continue. Species are listed in
Appendix I or II through a vote of the signatory parties at one of the biannual
conferences required by CITES?28
The CITES treaty allows a country to take a reservation-or effectively to
opt out of the listing of a particular species-either upon joining CITES* or
when there is an amendment to the appendices concerning that species.' If
a country takes a reservation, the country is exempted from the Convention for
that species. 3' A reservation therefore allows a country to trade animal
products freely with countries that either are not a party to CITES or have
taken a reservation.32 The initial intent of the reservation process was to
protect domestic industries that relied upon the species.33 The reservation
process, however, created a loophole through which products of protected
species can be "laundered." Some states with reservations receive the products
and process them into final goods that are considered permissible for trade
purposes. 34 Because the products must be a "readily recognizable part"" of
the protected animal, trade in ivory, for example, is no longer prohibited once
it has been carved.36 In sum, use of the reservation process can limit the
efficacy of an Appendix I ban.
25. Id.
26. CITES, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2, c. a, 27 U.S.T. at 1095. 993 U.N.T.S. at 247.
27. Id. art. IV, para. 3. 27 U.S.T. at 1095-96, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247.
28. Id art. XI, para. 2 & para. 3, cl. b, 27 U.S.T. at 1104-05. 993 U.N.T.S. at 251.
29. Id. art. XXIII, para. 2, cl. a, 27 U.S.T. at 1116, 993 U.N.T.S. at 257.
30. Id. art. XXIII, para. 1, 27 U.S.T. at 1116, 993 U.N.T.S. at 257; id. an. XV. para. 3.27 U ST. at
1112, 993 U.N.T.S. at 255.
31. Id. art. XXIII, para. 3, 27 U.S.T. at 1116, 993 U.N.T.S. at 257.
32. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 323.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 323-24. For a brief description of how some countries have laundered elephant tusks to
avoid CITES, see BONNER, supra note 2. at 96.
35. CITES, supra note 7, art. I, cl. b(ii), 27 U.S.T. at 1090. 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. Theoretically any
product made or taken from a dead animal, such as the hide or tusk of an elephant. is included in the
restrictions on trade. Until 1988, however, carved ivory was not considered a recognizable part of the
elephant, and thus was not subject to regulation under CITES. FAVRE, supra note 8. at 126. After 1988,
new CITES regulations required carved ivory to be accompanied by the same import/export permits
required of uncarved ivory. Id. at 134.
36. FAVE, supra note 8, at 324; Glennon, supra note 2, at 12.
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B. CITES and the Elephant
The African elephant was placed on Appendix II in 1977."7 Subsequent
population surveys in the late 1970's and early 1980's revealed the continuing
drop in elephant populations.38 The sustained decline led to the development
of the Ivory Export Quota System (IEQS) at the 1985 CITES convention.39
IEQS required each ivory-exporting state to determine the number of elephant
tusks that it could export each year40 and to mark each tusk with its country
of origin and a unique code number.4' The system created a database that
would assist customs agents in determining which countries could legally
export ivory within their quota.42 The primary goal was to ensure that a
country accepting ivory for import actually ascertained that a valid export
permit had been granted for that ivory.
43
The theory of the IEQS was better than its practice. Because each country
was permitted unilaterally to determine its quota, a country was not bound by
any scientific or international estimates of the sustainable number of elephant
culls. The quotas of some countries had no basis in reality. For example,
Somalia set its 1986 quota at 17,000 tusks, despite an estimated elephant
population of only 6000. Raymond Bonner explains that Somalia was actually
planning to export tusks illegally taken in Kenya. 44 It was soon determined
that the quota system was not achieving its goal,45 and the international
community recognized that further action was necessary to save the elephant.
In 1989, the CITES conference banned all trade in ivory by moving the
African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I. Earlier that year, the United
States and several European countries unilaterally had imposed sweeping bans
on ivory imports,46 and the African Wildlife Foundation and World Wide
37. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 125.
38. BONNER, supra note 2, at 51; see Ricciuti, supra note 1, at 17; supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
39. Glennon, supra note 2, at 12; see also FAVRE, supra note 8, at 127-37.
40. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 127. The elephant population can increase despite culling so long as culls
are limited to elephants beyond their reproductive years and to smaller numbers of elephants than are born
into a population. BONNER, supra note 2, at 96. In the absence of outside interference, elephants'
reproductive rate normally exceeds the death rate from natural causes. See ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note
4, at 83 (noting resiliency of elephant populations in Addo, a protected elephant enclave in South Africa).
Protected elephant populations gi'ow at 4.5% to 5% per year. Jane Perlez, African Wildlife Parks: Is Less
Wild the Way of the Future?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, at C4; see also HARLAND, supra note 8, at 19
(reporting 6% elephant population growth under ideal conditions).
41. FAVRE, supra note 8, at 129.
42. Id. at 127-29.
43. Id. at 130.
44. BONNER, supra note 2, at 96.
45. Some analysts contend, however, that the IEQS was never given a real chance to work. Id. at 143;
cf infra text accompanying notes 250-55.
46. BONNER, supra note 2, at 34; see, e.g., African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 4201-4245 (1988) (authorizing conservation expenditures; banning most ivory imports; providing
criminal penalties for violations). The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to ban ivory imports from
nations that are determined to have ineffective elephant preservation programs. Id. § 4222.
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Fund for Nature had expressed support for a full international ban on
trading.47 East African nations, where elephant populations had been
plummeting,48 supported the ban.49 In contrast, the southern African
countries, where elephant populations were increasing or remaining stable,
opposed the ban.50 The proposed amendment was passed over the opposition
of the southern African countries, which nevertheless took reservations.
Because no major ivory-purchasing nations took reservations there was no
opportunity for significant legal sales to CITES signatories.5 '
The 1992 CITES conference renewed the debate on Appendix I's terms.
The group of countries favoring sustainable utilization, including Zimbabwe,
attacked the complete ban and sought to allow countries with effective active
wildlife management programs to sell elephant parts. 2 The group's proposal
would require use of revenues earned from "beneficial use" of wildlife to
provide additional money to "rural wildlife-producer communities," to "further
invest in wildlife development," or to "provide income at a national level to
developing countries. 53 The proposed changes were rejected.'
International efforts to protect the elephant have consisted of progressively
tighter controls on the trade of its derivative products culminating in a total
trade ban. These policies, however, have failed to eradicate either consumers'
demand5 5 for elephant products or the supply56 of elephant ivory. Similarly,
there have been few concerted international efforts to increase actual protection
of the elephant by funding tighter antipoaching enforcement aimed at
constraining ivory supply. The CITES ban was essentially an international
mandate for African countries to act.57
47. BONNER, supra note 2, at 34.
48. Id. at 91.
49. Id. at 129. But see id at 92 (suggesting some Kenyans opposed ban).
50. Id. at 91-92 (including Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe).
51. Michael Sutton, World Wildlife Fund, Lecture at Yale Law School (Apr. 12, 1994).
52. Favre, supra note 5, at 903.
53. Id. at 903 n.106.
54. Id. at 904.
55. A law alone is unlikely to eliminate consumer demand. See supra note 8; cf The Wages of
Prohibition, THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 24, 1994-Jan. 6, 1995, at 21, 21 (noting failure of U.S. drug laws to
stop cocaine use or trafficking).
56. Supply, in this Note, means the supply of ivory and other elephant products, rather than the supply
of live elephants. Thus, protecting elephants presumably increases the supply of elephants, while
diminishing the supply of ivory and other elephant products.
57. The ban involves important national sovereignty issues. One author notes. "As many Africans see
it, white people are making rules to protect animals that white people want to see in parks that white people
visit." BONNER, supra note 2, at 85; see also John Waithaka, The Elephant Mlenace. WILDuFE
CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 62, 62 ("Government wildlife policies were instituted in such a way
that people who had killed... wildlife products for income were treated as poachers. Local people, then.
felt denied the use of resources that they considered to be theirs."). One estimate suggested that the ban
amounted to a $50 million tax on African nations in the form of lost revenue from ivory. BONNER. supra
note 2, at 142.
Michael Glennon has developed a theory of a global environmental right that allows all nations to
expect that an endangered species will be preserved by the nation in which that species exists. Glennon.
supra note 2, at 34-35. Glennon argues that his global environmental right gives rise to a corresponding
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I. THE TWO MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
African countries must reconcile the tension between the incentives to
preserve elephants and the incentives to reap value from dead elephants. Live
elephants can generate tourism revenue"8 and produce additional elephants.
Substantial value can also be derived, however, from elephant products. Ivory
was worth over $100 per pound in 1989," meaning that a single elephant
could carry more than $1000-worth of ivory.6 Further, the hides and meat are
valuable, 6' and a trophy hunt for an elephant commands a high price.
62
Hunters' expenditures on such hunts far exceed the cost of the license required
by the government, bringing additional money to an area. Elephant
preservation, therefore, imposes substantial opportunity costs on a community.
There are also real costs to retaining elephants. In Zimbabwe, elephants
have been known to destroy crops and to kill people.6' Elephants damage
buildings, destroy water pipes, kill livestock,6 and are generally considered
to be pests.65 Experiences in Kenya have been similar. 6 Thus there is an
global environmental obligation, which makes it incumbent upon all nations to support financially the
efforts of a country attempting to preserve a species. Id. at 35. Nonetheless, large-scale monetary support
has not been forthcoming. BONNER, supra note 2, at 142. Glennon leaves unresolved whether the right may
be claimed if the obligation goes unmet.
Favre writes, "[CITES] is based upon 1960's perceptions of wildlife issues, as seen by North
American and European drafters.... Many of the developing countries have a different perspective about
wildlife management arising out of their own philosophy, economic reality and social needs." Favre, supra
note 5, at 876.
58. BONNER, supra note 2, at 219 (reporting estimate by contingent valuation that preservation of
elephants for viewing was worth $100 per tourist); Ricciuti, supra note 1, at 33 (reporting that Kenya
Wildlife Service estimates it earns $420 million per year from wildlife tourism). But see id. at 33-34
(noting that most countries could not approach Kenya's sizable tourism trade).
59. Glennon, supra note 2, at 26; see also HARLAND, supra note 8, at 37 (noting price of $135 per
pound at pre-ban peak in 1989); Ricciuti, supra note I, at 18 (same); cf. Richard E. Leakey, A Perspective
from Kenya: Elephants Today and Tomorrow, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 58, 58 (citing
pre-ban price of $140 per pound). The post-ban price is less certain, but estimated to be about $5 per
pound. Id. But compare id. with Killing a Giant for Its Teeth, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1994, at 8 (comparing
elephant ivory price of $225 per pound to $30 per pound price of hippopotamus-tooth ivory).
60. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 10 n.74 (reporting that elephant tusks declined from 15-20 pounds
to an average of 7 pounds by 1990); see also HARLAND, supra note 8, at 37 (noting decline of average tusk
weight to 10 pounds in 1987). Another writer reports $3600 as the gain for the middleman or final exporter
from an elephant. Leakey, supra note 59, at 58.
61. Randy Simmons & Urs Kreuter, Save an Elephant-Buy Ivory, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1989, at D3
(noting hides worth $2000 each).
62. BONNER, supra note 2, at 268 (noting that Zimbabwe charged $3750 per elephant hunting license
in 1989); Brian Child, The Elephant as a Natural Resource, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr, 1993,
at 60, 61 (reporting trophy prices up to $12,000); Bill Keller, Splat! Splat! This Elephant "Kill" Is a Paint
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at A4 (reporting trophy fee of $6000); see also id. at A4 (reporting
elephant "hunts" costing $750, in which elephant is shot with paint gun); cf. BONNER, supra note 2, at 241
(noting substantial potential value that limited hunting would have for countries).
63. Jerelyn Eddings, Overabundant Elephants Make Out Like Pigs, or Simply Giant Pests, in
Zimbabwe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at A7; Ricciuti, supra note 1, at 18 (noting 500 Zimbabweans killed
by elephants between 1982 and 1989).
64. Michael Satchell, Wildlife's Last Chance, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1993, at 68, 68.
65. Eddings, supra note 63, at A7.
66. Waithaka, supra note 57, at 63. Rampaging elephants have reportedly destroyed harvests; disrupted
schools; damaged barns, trees, dams, trenches; and killed livestock and people. Id. A survey revealed that
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understandable desire on the part of local people to eliminate the threat posed
by elephants. Given Africa's increasing competition for land use,67 retaining
the native peoples' desire to preserve the elephant is a particularly important
part of any solution.68
Elephant protection is expensive: Estimates suggest the expenditure
required to protect a square kilometer of elephant habitat is over $200 per
year.69 One source estimates Africa's cumulative wildlife protection costs at
$305 million. 70  Another estimate placed Africa's cost to protect only
elephants inside of parks and preserves at $100 million per year.7' Total
annual expenditures for elephant protection throughout Africa are currently
about $50 million.72 African nations must, therefore, raise more funds for
elephant protection if the elephant is to survive.
Zimbabwe and Kenya have approached the problem of preserving elephant
populations differently. Zimbabwe, like South Africa, relies on profits from
elephants to support its wildlife management program. 73 Zimbabwe's policy
grants a share of elephant proceeds to local people. This policy allows the
local population to share in the value of elephants and to appropriate that value
for antipoaching patrols, various measures to protect and manage the elephant
population, and other local needs. Zimbabwe sought to operate within the
constraints of an Appendix II listing (until the elephant was moved to
Appendix I), determining that its exports of elephant products did not cause a
decline in elephant numbers within its borders. Since the ban, Zimbabwe has
relied on remaining methods of profiting from elephants, such as trophy hunts,
to augment funding for protection programs.
Kenya bans all hunting of elephants
7' and sales of elephant products.
7"
97% of peasant farmers in one area strongly dislike elephants and nearly all had substantial crop losses to
elephants. Id.; see also BONNER, supra note 2, at 214 (noting significant crop loss to elephants)
67. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
68. African tribes are frequently conservationist as pan of their culture, reflecting their dependence
upon wildlife. BONNER, supra note 2, at 82. Nevertheless, many conservationist attempts in recent years
have been viewed as imperialistic or colonialist because the programs have not involved local populations.
I at 85; see also supra note 57. The problem is thus not one of changing local attitudes, but rather of
involving local populations and providing proper incentives.
69. BONNER, supra note 2, at 93-94 (reporting that conservationist estimates place cost between S200
and $400 per square kilometer, assuming sufficiently high ranger salaries to avoid corruption. and enough
money for one ranger per 50 km2).
70. Concar & Cole, supra note 4, at 3 1.
71. ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 4. at 170-71 (presenting views of Rowan Martin. Zimbabwe's
Director of Department of Parks and Wild Life Management).
72. Id. at 171.
73. BONNER, supra note 2, at 91-92. Note that Malawi. Namibia. and Zambia also support sustainable
utilization. Peter Aldhous, Critics Urge Reform of CITES Endangered List, 355 NATURE 758. 758 (1992).
Zambia has temporarily withdrawn its support for ivory trade because it has been unable to control
poaching. B.J. Kelso, Hunting for Conservation, APR. REP.. July-Aug. 1993. at 68. 71.
74. The Wildlife (Conservation and Management) (Prohibition on Hunting of Game Animals)
Regulations, 30 Kenya Gazette Supp. (May 20. 1977) (banning all game animal hunting). For Kenyan
legislation relating to the protection, conservation, and management of wildlife, see generally The wildlife
(Conservation and Management) Act, No. I of 1976. 8 Kenya Gazette Supp. (Feb. 13. 1976).
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Kenya implemented its prohibition on the sale of elephant products prior to the
international trade ban, but it generally emulates the CITES Appendix I
stipulations. Kenya's method combines antipoaching patrols with a domestic
trade ban in order to preserve and protect its elephants.
Each scheme may be described generally as a management plan: Kenya
manages the elephant population by prohibiting trade in elephant products,
while Zimbabwe manages it by providing monetary incentives to local groups
that actively help to protect the elephant population from poachers.
Zimbabwe's plan is frequently termed sustainable utilization. Because
Zimbabwe's approach contemplates active management of the elephant
population, this Note refers to it as a "management strategy." The Kenyan
system, which focuses on elephant protection, is referred to as a "protective
strategy."
A. Active Management Strategies
Zimbabwe's management plan operates on the premise that "African
wildlife, if it is to survive in the long run, must pay its way."76 Before the
Appendix I ban, the Zimbabwean government spent up to $15 million per year
for all of its wildlife protection,77 using money generated by wildlife trade to
pay for its protection. Since the elephant was switched to Appendix I,
Zimbabwe has reduced its expenditures to $5.5 million.78 International
contributions, estimated at $500,000 per year, do not compensate for this
shortfall in funding. 79 Zimbabwe's government is hard-pressed to increase
funding, given the competing desires for health care and schools.80 Because
African and foreign governments and conservationist groups are unwilling or
unable to pay for elephant preservation, Zimbabwe has maintained that it
should be allowed to sell elephant products in order to fund elephant
protection. It believes that revenue from tourism and the sale of elephant
products would provide several million dollars that could be used for
conservation efforts. 8
75. The Wildlife (Conservation and Management) (Revocation of Dealer's Licenses) Act, No. 5 of
1978, 35 Kenya Gazette Supp. (June 23, 1978) (revoking all licenses to trade in wildlife products).
76. Concar & Cole, supra note 4, at 29.
77. See ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 4, at 170.
78. Remer 1yson, Herds Pay Highest Price-Ivory, Horn Ban Is Under Fire as Poaching Plagues
Africa, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 8, 1993, at Al.
79. ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 4, at 170; see BONNER, supra note 2, at 158 (noting that pledges
to help Africa combat this problem totaled about $8.5 million for all of Africa in 1989); see also id. at 142
(reporting one estimate that ban effectively imposed approximately $100 million cost on African nations
without compensation).
80. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 93 (describing how impoverishment of many African states
precludes high expenditures necessary for adequate wildlife protection); Child, supra note 62, at 61 (rural
family of eight has average income of $150).
81. BONNER, supra note 2, at 107 (noting that prior to ban, Zimbabwe's "thriving domestic carving
industry" earned $2 million per year from sale of ivory gleaned from culls, and that some of this revenue
1482 [Vol. 104: 1473
How the Elephant Lost His Tusks
Zimbabwe has allowed local people to manage wildlife in their area for
two decades, since the Rhodesian government passed the Parks and Wild Life
Act.82 The Act gave landholders both the responsibility for, and the use of,
animals on their land." In 1982, Zimbabwe developed a program pursuant to
the Act called CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources). CAMPFIRE asks local people to manage their wildlife
resources, s4 on "the premise that the wildlife belongs to the person on whose
land it is found. ' 5 Beginning in 1989, Zimbabwe Trust, a local nonprofit
development organization, allocated funds to the Nyaminyami district and the
CAMPFIRE program.8 6 The program turned over to the district council of
Nyaminyami, a communal land area in northwestern Zimbabwe," the means
to manage local wildlife resources.8 This involves giving local people
technical assistance in managing the wildlife. 9 Each year a census of the
local elephant population is submitted to the national wildlife department."'
After this count is verified, the local council is given a quota of 1% of the
elephants to hunt or cull as the council's needs dictate. 9'
In 1989, the Nyaminyami area of Zimbabwe earned enough from the sale
of wildlife products (not just elephants) to support its conservation at a level
well above the norm,92 and to support its purchases of otherwise unaffordable
social services. 93 Before the trade ban, residents earned profits from the sale
of hides and ivory. 94 Since ivory sales are now banned, Zimbabwe has relied
went into general treasury and ultimately to country's parks and conservation departunents); Child, supra
note 62, at 61 (noting pre-ban income of $2 million, 40% from trophy elephants); Ricciuti. supra note I.
at 26 (reporting that Zimbabwe earned over $13 million from elephant products in 1980's. two-thirds from
ivory). Some local communities have S1.6 million (pre-ban prices) of stockpiled ivory Id.
82. Parks and Wild Life Act, No. 14 (1975); Alastair Bradstock. Communtry Is Key ro Conservation.
GEOGRAPHICAL MAG., Dec. 1990, at 17, 17.
83. Bradstock, supra note 82, at 17.
84. Id.
85. BONNER, supra note 2. at 285. This is consistent with the common law doctnne of ratone Solt.
which dictates that possession of animals is vested in the owner of the land on which they are found. See
Keeble v. Hickeringill, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 286 (Q.B. 1707) (reprint ed.). repnnted in JESSE
DUJKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 31 (3d ed. 1993) (affirming property right in animal "seduced"
onto property owner's land). This doctrine contrasts with the United States' approach, whereby wildlife is
held in public trust by state governments for the benefit of the people. See Geer v. Connecticut. 161 U.S.
519 (1896). It also differs from the colonialist attitude that reserved wildlife for European elites. See Child.
supra note 62, at 60.
86. BONNER, supra note 2, at 262--63. In 1989. the Zimbabwe Trust allocated S1 .5 million over five
years to further the reestablishment of Nyaminyami's wildlife management program. CAMPFIRE is a
significant part of this program. Id.
87. Id. at 253.
88. Bradstock, supra note 82, at 17.
89. Id.
90. Child, supra note 62, at 61.
91. Id.
92. See BONNER, supra note 2. at 268 (noting improved equipment and higher pay for game %ardens)
Each of 12 wards in Nyaminyami earned S3200 from wildlife for 1989. Ricciut, stupra note I. at 34.
93. See Child, supra note 62, at 61.
94. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61. at D3.
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principally on sport hunting,95 and has reduced its culling operations.96
Communities sell hunting permits97 that can earn between $12,00091 and
$25,000.99 Part of this revenue is returned to the community, while part is
dedicated to national wildlife protection.' e Individuals who sustain crop
damage are still compensated, 10' and the meat from wildlife is sold at cost
to local communities.'t 2 Local populations continue to receive "cash
dividends from the proceeds of wildlife management"'' 3 that give them an
incentive to preserve elephants.
Zimbabwe's philosophy is also manifest in its acceptance of purely private
wildlife ownership. For example, the Save Conservancy reserve, created by
ranchers who have collectively fenced in their property, provides a refuge for
animals driven from drought-stricken parts of the country.'"' The owners
have set up antipoaching patrols and wildlife management programs,0 5
having found that wildlife can be a more lucrative use of land (even with the
ban) than livestock. The arid, harsh land does not support cattle stocks
particularly well, but wildlife flourishes more readily,1' 6 allowing the
ranchers to earn money from tourism, including photographic safaris, and
trophy hunting. 0 7 These earnings allow the ranchers to improve their
antipoaching patrols and to receive more advanced scientific advice as to how
many animals they may cull to preserve a sustainable population.'
Since the CITES ban on elephant products went into effect, the success of
the program in Nyaminyami has declined. For example, fewer elephants were
culled in 1990 than the regional management plan for that year deemed
appropriate.'0o Although sport hunting continues,"0 the local warden
estimated that the inability to sell the tusks and hides cost the district $20,000
95. Child, supra note 62, at 61.
96. See Mary Cole, Zimbabwe To End Experiment in Conservation?, NEW SCIENTIST, June 12, 1993,
at 8, 8.
97. Child, supra note 62, at 61; Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3.
98. Child, supra note 62, at 61.
99. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3.
100. Child, supra note 62, at 61.
101. Bradstock, supra note 82, at 17.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Mary Cole, Private Reserve for Zimbabwe's Thirsty Elephants, NEw SCIENTIST, July 25, 1992,
at 10, 10.
105. Id.
106. One estimate suggests that tourism earns $50-100/hectare annually, and hunting $10/hectare,
whereas cattle ranching can lose $5/hectare. ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 4, at 172.
107. Cole, supra note 104, at 10. There has been a recent move away from hunting and toward
tourism, but culling may be necessary nonetheless. Id.
108. Id.
109. BONNER, supra note 2, at 271 (noting that 69 elephants could have been killed while sustaining
the population, yet suggesting fewer than that were actually killed). Zimbabwe uses a computer simulation
model to help determine which elephants to kill and what proportion of the population to cull. Ricciuti,
supra note 1, at 27.
110. Bradstock, supra note 82, at 17.
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in the first eight months of the year."' This amount is equivalent to
approximately 25% of the total income of the area." 2 The warden estimated
that Nyaminyami would have earned $125,000 from the sale of ivory had the
number of culls reached the number of elephants that the management
determined could be killed." 3 This amount is roughly equivalent to the total
that the Nyaminyami district receives in foreign aid for nutrition and primary
education programs."' The effect of the CITES ban on elephant and ivory
trade was to place a significant obstacle in the way of the achievement of
Zimbabwe's preservation goal. The ban on ivory sales removed a vital source
of funding," 5 and consequently Zimbabwe's ability to afford protection for
the animals declined.
Between the ban on ivory trade and internal political changes, the
continuation of CAMPFIRE is unlikely."6 Both before and after the ban,
however, Zimbabwe's general policy has been to allow its people to share the
profits wildlife can earn as compensation for the headaches it can cause. The
policies provide incentives to communities to protect their wildlife because
perpetuation of the elephant population allows them to earn money from
tourism, while culling (prior to the CITES ban) and trophy hunting allow them
to earn profits from elephants.
South Africa, like Zimbabwe, actively manages its wildlife to maximize
its usefulness to the local population. Kruger National Park, the centerpiece of
the South African game park system, is amply fenced to keep poachers out and
animals in, and its antipoaching patrols are fully effective." 7 Like
Zimbabwe's communities, the park profits from elephants. It pays for its
operations through admissions fees and other tourist expenditures, and (prior
to the CITES ban) through the sale of tusks and hides from culled elephants.
Unlike Zimbabwe, ownership of wildlife is vested in the South African people
through the government, rather than directly through local property rights.
Kruger has so successfully protected its elephants that park managers have
culled elephants simply to ensure that the herds did not grow too large and
decimate the vegetation."' Prior to the trade ban, South Africa could profit
from its success in preserving the species by using funds from sales of
elephant parts to provide improvements in the habitat for elephants as well as
111. BONNER, supra note 2, at 271. Only those elephants that were damaging crops and could not be
chased away were actually killed. See also Ricciuti, supra note I. at 34 ('"We like wildlife more than
before, but not 100 percent. They still kill people when crops are in the field. We have tusks[,I it would
benefit us more if we could sell them."' (quoting local restdent)).
112. BONNER, supra note 2, at 271.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Cf Bradstock, supra note 82. at 17 (claiming that although tvory sales "made up just a small
proportion of the income from the safari hunt... [they) still made a signifieant difference-).
116. See Cole, supra note 96, at 8.
117. Perlez, supra note 40. at C4.
118. Id.
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other wildlife. The government also used these funds to improve the park for
tourists. Now, however, the country may profit only from tourist revenues.
The overriding aim of the southern African management programs is
consistent with the goals of a CITES Appendix II animal listing: preservation
of the species through close attention to its condition and habitat. Appendix II
prohibits trade only when such trade is "incompatible with [the species']
survival.""' 9 Zimbabwe and South Africa have made good-faith efforts to
engage only in trade that does not interfere with their recognized responsibility
to maintain elephant populations at a sustainable level,' and both countries
have demonstrated that trade can, in fact, actually support preservation of the
species. The number of elephants culled each year is determined by reasonable
scientific estimates of what the habitat can support, rather than a shortsighted,
profit-oriented approach.
B. Protective Strategies
Kenya's management plan bans all hunting and killing of elephants.1
2 1
Since 1978, Kenya has sought to protect all elephants, as well as other
wildlife, from poachers. 2 The nation has chosen to focus on tourism as a
means of earning revenue from the elephant-a reflection of an ideology that
holds that people should profit from wildlife through its viewing value
only.' 2' In 1989, the President of Kenya dramatized the country's
commitment to this belief by setting fire to a pile of confiscated elephant tusks
worth about $3 million, rather than selling the ivory to provide additional
protection funds.
124
Kenya's antipoaching efforts in the 1980's were unsuccessful. Because
Kenya had limited funds for conservation, the decline of the country's elephant
population continued throughout the decade. The nation spent only a fraction
119. CITES, supra note 7, art. II, para. 2, cl. a, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
120. A plausible argument can be made that some legal sales of ivory help support the survival of the
elephant elsewhere. A legal supply of ivory reduces pressure on other supplies, so that poaching elsewhere
should diminish. Thus, legal ivory may undercut the market for poached ivory, given the additional costs
of obtaining ivory through poaching. See Mary Cole, Hologram To Herald Resumption of Ivory Trade,
New SCIENTIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 7, 7 (."The illegal trade has a monopoly on the market .... If legal
trade was opened between, say, SACIM and Japan there would be no middle men and the cost of the end
product would be lower, which would make the illegal trade uneconomic."' (quoting Rob Monro of the
Zimbabwe Trust)); cf Killing a Giant for Its Teeth, supra note 59, at 8 (noting killing of hippopotamuses
for their ivory teeth as substitute for elephant ivory).
121. See supra notes 74-75; see also Isabel Wolff, Elephant Man, GEOGRAPHICAL MAC,, Sept. 1991.
at 40, 41.
122. In 1977, Kenya banned sport hunting. See supra note 74. The following year, Kenya banned all
trade in wildlife products. BONNER, supra note 2, at 216; see supra note 75.
123. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3; see Iain-Douglas Hamilton, You Can Help Elephants,
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 74, 74 (reporting estimated income of $25 million per year
from elephant tourism).
124. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3.
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of what was estimated as necessary to protect its elephant population."
Ranger salaries were very low, leaving personnel prone to poachers'
bribes.' 26 A 1990 Kenyan government report detailed the underlying
problem: corruption. 2 7 High-level Kenyan officials were involved in the
corruption, making its elimination substantially more difficult.' -' This
corruption affected Kenya's one legitimate source of revenue from the
elephant: park gate receipts.' 29 Entrance fees were lining the pockets of
government workers, rather than being returned to pay for improvements to the
parks or to the surrounding area.' 30
Until 1989, Kenya compensated farmers who lost crops to wildlife
damage, thereby helping to reconcile the conflict between elephant preservation
and human population needs. The farmlands from which elephants were
feeding frequently were the poorest in Kenya,' thus making compensation
even more necessary. In 1989, however, Kenya repealed the law providing
compensation to farmers because the growing number of claims substantially
exceeded the budgeted amount. 32 Fraud, consisting primarily of claims for
unfarmed land, contributed to the demise of the program.'3 Kenya's policy
of protecting elephants without profiting from them has thus led to two
problems: an inability to fund adequately its antipoaching efforts, and the
exclusion of human needs from the solution.
Kenya's protection program has improved over the last three years. A
reorganization of its wildlife service has helped reduce corruption.'3 It has
also instituted a stricter shoot-to-kill policy toward poachers.' 3' Furthermore,
Kenya hopes to obtain $200 million in funding from other nations to improve
elephant protection and tourist facilities.'"6 These recent changes suggest that
Kenya's strict protective approach may work, if properly organized and funded.
Whether its success can be sustained over longer periods, especially if outside
funding does not materialize, remains to be seen.
The Kenyan approach is essentially the same as that adopted by CITES for
Appendix I species. The rule is that no elephant products may be sold because
125. BONNER, supra note 2, at 93 (reporting expenditures of S10/km". while suggesting that
$200-400/km 2 is necessary).
126. See iU; id. at 134 (noting that "rangers... poached out of need. out of desperation.- sometimes
to help their children attend school).
127. IM. at 134-35.
128. Id. at 135.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 136.
131. See id. at 214.
132. Id.
133. Id. Note, however, that claims may now be compensated with provision of schools and health
centers. Waithaka, supra note 57, at 63. Such remuneration is. however, considered inadequate, partly
because other areas, undamaged by elephants, receive these goods too. Id.
134. See Wolff, supra note 121. at 40.
135. Id. at 41.
136. See id at 42.
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any trade is believed to be per se detrimental to the species. There is no
acknowledgment that limited trade may be consistent with the survival of the
species, as is true of Appendix II animals. It is a bright-line rule: Trade is
detrimental to the species and therefore banned.
C. Results of the Strategies
Elephant populations in Kenya have declined substantially during the
1980's. The population dropped during the decade from an estimated 65,000
to approximately 19,000.'37 Other countries in eastern and central Africa,
using policies resembling that used in Kenya, have had similar declines.,3 8
In contrast, Zimbabwe's elephant population has grown during the same period
from 30,000 to at least 43,000.139 Botswana, using a management scheme
like Zimbabwe's, has seen its elephant population double to 56,000 over the
last decade. 40 Elephant populations have been increasing 5% annually in
recent years in the countries using this type of active management
approach.'4' The southern African active management strategy thus appears
to protect the elephant species more successfully than Kenya's protective
strategy.
Because of the profitability of wildlife and the success of CAMPFIRE, the
amount of land available for wildlife in Zimbabwe increased threefold between
1988 and 1993.42 In one area people abandoned their homes and created a
more centralized settlement to allow more room for wildlife to flourish.'
43
Another community dug waterholes and provided food to maintain the elephant
population during a drought.'" Thus, Zimbabwe's program has helped to
reconcile human settlement with animal needs for habitat preservation in a way
that redounds to wildlife's benefit. Kenya's program has not enjoyed nearly the
same success.
137. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3 (reporting decline from 65,000 to 19,000 between 1979
and 1989); see also U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, 1991/92 ENVIRONMENTAL DATA REPORT 207 (3d cd. 1992)
[hereinafter UNEP REPORT] (16,000 in 1989); Ricciuti, supra note 1, at 17 (reporting 167,000 in 1973 and
16,000 in 1989); Wolff, supra note 121, at 40 (reporting decline from 60,000 in early 1980's to less than
17,000 in 1989). Estimates of the Kenyan elephant population have recently increased to 26,000, but the
increase may reflect better methods of elephant counting, rather than an actual increase in population. See
id.
138. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3.
139. Id. (reporting increase from 30,000 to 43,000 between 1979 and 1989); see also UNEP REPORT,
supra note 137, at 207 (52,000 in 1989); Ricciuti, supra note 1, at 17 (32,000 in 1960, 52,000 in 1989,
70,000 in 1993).
140. BONNER, supra note 2, at 91; see also UNEP REPORT, supra note 137, at 207 (68,000 in 1989).
141. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3; see Ricciuti, supra note I, at 26.
142. Cole, supra note 96, at 8; cf Child, supra note 62, at 60 ("[Ihe real breakthrough is that the
rural poor are also setting aside land for wild animals.").
143. Child, supra note 62, at 61.
144. Id.
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Zimbabwe's management strategy has also addressed the problem of
insufficient funding for elephant protection more successfully than has Kenya's
protective strategy. Zimbabwe's program helped replenish the government's
coffers through the sale of ivory and other elephant products. Kenya's refusal
to sell ivory meant that it did not benefit from these potential revenues. Thus,
Zimbabwe's elephants generated more of their own protection money than did
Kenya's because Zimbabwe sold ivory. These results suggest that Zimbabwe's
active management program is the better method of preserving elephants.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE BANS, AND ELEPHANTS
Theoretical literature on property rights and the tragedy of the commons
helps to explain why active management programs are likely to be more
effective than protective programs in preserving the elephant species. A lack
of defined property rights has long been recognized to lead to overuse of a
resource.'45 If no one person or entity has control of a resource, then
individuals acting rationally will overconsume from the commons. The core
problem is that any person who tries to conserve a resource by husbanding it
today will see a competitor take the resource instead, leaving the
conservationist with nothing tomorrow." 6
A. Commons Problems
The commons examples most pertinent to the elephant come from natural
resource economics. The commons problem of underground oil pools is well
documented. 4 7 Common law applies the familiar rule of capture for
migratory and fugitive resources to an oil field: Whoever pumps the oil first
owns it.' Ownership rights attach only upon extraction, not discovery."4 9
This common law rule typically leads each firm that owns land over an oil
field to drill and drain the pool as quickly as possible. Each firm tends to
overcapitalize in order to pump more quickly, and therefore they collectively
dissipate any potential excess profits or rents"'o Overly rapid extraction,
145. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons. 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
146. See Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership. 63 J- PoL- EcoN. 116. 116
(1955) ("No one will take the trouble to husband and maintain a resource unless he has some reasonable
certainty of receiving some portion of the product of his management .... ").
147. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool
Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 87 (1984).
148. See, e.g., Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. Do Witt. 18 A. 724. 725 (Pa. 1889)
("[Subsurface oil, gas, and water] belong to the owner of the land. and are part of it. so long as they arc
on or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape ... the title of the former owner is gone.-);
cf. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (applying rule of capture to the "noxious
beast[] called a fox"').
149. Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 147. at 88.
150. Id.
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furthermore, reduces the total amount of oil a pool yields. 5 ' Therefore it is
advantageous to have a single extractor, or at least coordinated extraction, in
order to encourage an optimal level of capitalization and to maximize the total
quantity of oil withdrawn. The common law rule for oil, however, creates
incentives to exceed the optimal removal rate in the race to capture the oil.
Marine life provides even richer examples of commons problems. Surf
clams have been overexploited because of unrestrained access to clam
flats.'52 Surf clams are a typical common resource: Too many people harvest
the clams; clammers invest too much in equipment in order to increase their
share of the catch; and the clams are harvested before the optimal, fully grown
time.'53 Solutions to commons tragedies must address these three problems.
Townsend and Wilson summarize the economic analysis of the commons
problem by examining the fishery.'" They show that in an unregulated
fishery (generalizable to any open-access commons), entry of new fishermen
will continue as long as economic returns exceed those that could be earned
if the fishermen were employed in other occupations.' 55 At this level of
participation, total revenue and total cost are equal, as entry has dissipated all
profits. Unfortunately, this level of fishing is not sustainable: The stock of fish
grows ever smaller. 156 Profits and fish stocks may be sustained, however, if
the fishery is properly managed and access restricted. Maximum profits obtain
when total revenue less total cost is at its greatest.'57 This point is also where
marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal, the classic profit-maximizing
position. 5 ' More important, this fishing level is lower than that at which fish
stocks are stable, 159 meaning that the properly managed commons will have
an even greater stock of fish than it would if the maximum sustainable number
were withdrawn."'t
The problem of the elephant fits well into the commons paradigm. If no
person owns the elephant, but the elephant itself has value, rational actors each
will seek to take the elephant before someone else does. An elephant left alive
in the commons is valued by none,' 6' and therefore is taken as quickly as
possible. Just as people will race to take surf clams or fish, people will seek
151. See id. at 89.
152. Franz T. Litz, Harnessing Market Forces in Natural Resources Management: Lessons from the
Surf Clam Fishery, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 335, 345 (1994).
153. Id. at 338.
154. Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in "DI
QUEStON OF THE COMMONS 311 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987).
155. Id. at 316.
156. See id. at 315-17 (noting total revenue equals total cost at effort level consistent with decreasing
fish stocks).
157. See id. at 317.
158. See, e.g., PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 172-73 (14th ed. 1992).
159. Townsend & Wilson, supra note 154, at 317.
160. Id.
161. This analysis excludes, for the moment, tourism value derived from live elephants and focuses
on individual incentives to capture elephants for ivory.
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to capture the elephants before someone else does because the expected future
value of the resource is zero. There is no incentive to invest in the future of
the resource. Such a bias toward the present leads to the resource's depletion.
Although regions may reap tourism revenues from the elephant, an
individual cannot realize an elephant's full value until the elephant is dead:
Capturing the value of the resource requires slaughtering the elephant. 62 Just
as no one is able to capture for herself the value of clams left on tidal flats, a
hunter profits little, either from ivory or from tourism, when she leaves an
elephant in the wild. Under a common property regime, one must kill an
elephant and possess it in order to remove it from the commons and make it
one's own.' 63 Elephants are consumed more quickly than is optimal from a
societal standpoint because no one has an incentive to conserve elephants. In
effect, an elephant left in the wild has a value of zero. All the incentives
motivate hunters to kill elephants as quickly as possible.
B. Commons Solutions
Typical solutions to commons problems involve controls on the supply of
or demand for the resource. Reductions in demand diminish the incentives to
take the resource. Trade bans are intended to reduce overall demand, and thus
to reduce the number of elephants that are killed. Demand can also be reduced
through moral suasion. If everyone is convinced that ivory is useless (or has
substitutes'64), or is morally wrong to own, demand will drop, and fewer
elephants will be killed. The trick is to convince people of the evil ivory
production entails. This method, in theory, works as well as reducing demand
through market elimination.' 65
These methods do not always successfully reduce demand," however,
and markets usually develop to meet any residual demand. 67 There will
162. One study has noted that to sell ivory one must kill its "'factory." WOuTEt VAN DtER&N &
MARIus G.W. HUMMELINCK, NATURE'S PRicE: THE ECONOMICS OF MOTHER EARTI 137 (1979): see also
supra note 9.
163. The country may earn income from tourism, but it is difficult (if not impossible) for an individual
to capture that value. If a "poacher" could take the animal to her own zoo and charge admission, she could
capture the tourist value. If the elephant is a common resource. however, no one can appropriate this tounst
value for herself.
164. For example, new plastic-making techniques are being developed to make piano keys with a feel
indistinguishable from that of ivory piano keys. See Malcolm W. Browne. With Ivory in Short Supply.
Pianists Tickle the Polymers, N.Y. TIMES. May 23. 1993, at Cl. However. the ivory demands of piano
companies---two tusks per year for a large company-hardly affect overall demand Id.
165. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Afanagement Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE LJ. 1, 31-32 (suggesting moral suasion can sometimes be effective at lower cost
than other methods). The examples Rose provides generally involve face-to-face contact between people
with conflicting interests, a situation not present in the elephant's case.
166. Bradstock, supra note 8, at 14; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text for evidence of black markets in ivory developing
to circumvent international laws. See also Whose Elephants Are They' Anywvay?. THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 5.
1994, at 46, 46 (reporting 35 tons of black market ivory seized in last two years)
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always be some people who enjoy having something that very few others have,
perhaps because it is rare or expensive. 168 Diverse cultural attitudes make a
comprehensive elimination of ivory demand nearly impossible.169 As long as
there remains a demand for ivory, there will remain incentives for someone to
kill elephants to supply that demand.
Other possible solutions to commons problems involve controls on supply.
In theory, a prohibition on ivory trade makes it more difficult for a person who
kills an elephant to sell the ivory. This, in turn, will make a poacher less likely
to incur the costs of obtaining the ivory.70 Making a market illegal changes
incentives. Providers of the illegal product incur the costs of evading law
enforcement and may incur costs from confiscation of the product as well as
penalties. These costs increase the overall cost of supplying the product, most
likely increasing price and reducing the quantity traded.' Thus, diminishing
the rewards of ivory acquisition through a ban should decrease such
acquisitions, thereby sparing the elephant the blast from the poacher's assault
rifle. Markets for illegal products, however, have ways of developing to meet
demand, 72 so eliminating legal trade may be a fruitless attempt to eradicate
trade in elephant tusks completely.
There are several typical methods of controlling supply to reduce the
pressure on a common resource. Carol Rose identifies four general strategies
for managing common resources: doing nothing; prohibiting new entrants from
taking; prescribing methods by which the resource may be taken; and defining
property rights. 73 Doing nothing to manage a common resource is what led
to the need for action: Because poachers have been allowed to kill elephants
wantonly, the elephant population has been decimated. Some affirmative
168. See supra note 8.
169. See FAVRE, supra note 8, at 123; cf Michael Tennesen, Poaching, Ancient Traditions and the
Law, AUDUBON, July-Aug. 1991, at 90, 92 (noting frequent inconsistencies between Western values and
other cultural traditions).
170. There are costs to killing elephants, including search costs, equipment costs, and processing costs.
171. There is a downside to making the market illegal. Two notable problems are that it limits
opportunities to monitor the market, see SARAH FITZGERALD, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: WHOSE
BUSINESS IS IT? 109 (1989) (noting trade ban on rhinoceros horn makes "tracking market routes difficult"),
and that other forms of regulation are made impossible, cf STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993) 194-97 (arguing
illegality of drugs leaves their safety completely unregulated). The inability to monitor is crucial for the
purpose of ascertaining which countries are managing their elephant populations well. An inability to
regulate the market means that there is no possibility of putting other constraints on the market. For
example, a complete ban precludes the possibility of either a quota system or a taxation scheme. Taxing
ivory might allow revenues to be returned to countries to help preserve elephants. Cf. Rose, supra note 165,
at 36 (arguing that pollution taxes can be used for environmental improvements).
172. See, e.g., Richard M. Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground Economy,
103 YALE LJ. 2157, 2164-76 (1994). Despite American efforts to eliminate the illicit drug trade, drugs
are still available. See, e.g., DUKE & GROSS, supra note 171; The Wages of Prohibition, supra note 55. A
ban on rhinoceros horn trade has failed to stem the flow of horn to demanding countries. See infra part V.
173. See Rose, supra note 165, at 9-10. Rose suggests that prescribing the method of taking is akin
to command-and-control regulations, see id. at 10, which allow takings only in a prescribed manner. Id.
at 19.
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strategy is necessary to preserve a sustainable number of elephants. Preventing
access of new hunters to the commons would be similarly ineffective;
additional restrictions, such as a limit on the total number taken, would still be
necessary. 74 Prescribing specific technologies for taking from the commons
would be nearly impossible. Game wardens have found it difficult to identify
poachers, and it would be no easier for them to certify whether a hunter was
using the proper rifle. The remaining solution under Rose's model is a system
of property rights.
Assignment of some form of property rights has often been the preferred
solution to commons problems. Each of the problems noted in Section A of
Part III has been ameliorated through an allocation of "taking rights." A
common solution to the problem of the shared oil field is unitization. This
strategy gives the extraction rights to one company and then allocates the costs
and revenues to each of the owners of the oil field.'" The alternative
solution is to prorate the oil by assigning quotas and allowing oil withdrawal
to be controlled by central agreement among the owners.'76 Such solutions
essentially vest a right in the oil prior to extraction, thereby eliminating the
race to extract the oil that would have led to overcapitalization and wasted
resources.
Long-overfished fisheries have recently begun to implement quota systems
to restrict fishing to sustainable levels. New Zealand has already created a
system of transferable quotas for its fishermen,' and the United States has
been contemplating implementation of such a program.' 8 An entitlement to
a certain amount of fish reduces destructive competition because it eliminates
the incentive to race to capture the resource. The quota "is, in effect, reserved
for that fisherman."'179 A quota allows fishermen to pursue a least-cost
strategy 8 ' for collecting their fish, unencumbered by the seasonal, gear, size,
and area restrictions previously employed to slow the depletion of the
resource. 18' The plan eliminates the inefficient restrictions imposed on
fishermen to slow the taking of fish, and replaces them with a simple quota.
The surf clam problem has been ameliorated by the implementation of
"quasi-property rights."'' 82 This strategy involves first establishing a total
quota on the number of harvestable clams. Next, the quota is divided and
174. See WILSON & AYERST, supra note 8. at 150 (noting that colonies granted licenses to limited
number of people for certain number of elephants each year).
175. Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 147. at 89.
176. Id. at 90.
177. See Litz, supra note 152, at 349 nn.149. 353.
178. See Peter Passell, U.S. Giving Certain Boat Owners Exclusive Rights To Fish off Coast. NY
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1991, at Al.
179. William J. Milliken, Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas and Antitrust Law. I OCEAN &
COASTAL LJ. 35, 39 (1994).
180. Id. at 39-40.
181. Id. at 37.
182. Litz, supra note 152, at 341.
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allocated to the various clammers according to a formula.'8 3 A tagging and
registration system ensures that the clammer was entitled to catch the clams
she brings to dock. 84 The quotas provide incentives for fishermen to
maximize the value of their harvest by taking only the most valuable clams,
and thus the harvesting occurs at the "socially optimal age."' 85 Stable stocks
of clams and reductions in the over-capitalization of the industry provide early
evidence of the success of the system.'86 The most important part of this plan
is the setting of the overall quota: It is set so that clams are harvested at a
sustainable level, and therefore eliminates the problem of resource
depletion.
187
Another fruitful example of property-rights-based solutions to commons
problems comes from the lobster industry. 88 In Maine, two systems of
lobster allocation prevail. Both involve membership in a "harbor gang.'
' 89
The critical difference is how these gangs defend their areas. Gang areas are
either nucleated, with rights strongest near the gang's own harbor; or
perimeter-defended, with the gang holding exclusive rights to lobster within a
certain area.'9g Rights in a nucleated area are not necessarily exclusive.
Nucleated areas may overlap, and on the margins members of different gangs
may both set lobster traps.'9 ' Perimeter-defended areas, in contrast, are
lobstered exclusively by their gangs. t 2 The property right, therefore, is more
exclusive in the perimeter-defended areas.
A comparison of the two territorial lobster allocation methods reveals the
advantages of exclusivity in a private property regime. In perimeter-defended
areas, capital investment is lower: Fewer boats per square mile are used.' 93
Likewise, lobstermen need to exert less effort for an equal catch.'" The
lobsters caught are larger and hence more valuable.'" Thus the perimeter-
defended system requires less investment and labor but yields a higher return
than the nucleated system.
183. Id. at 341-43. These allocations may subsequently be bought and sold. Id. at 357.
184. Id. at 350-51.
185. Id. at 344-45.
186. Id. at 359.
187. Id. at 348. A similar scheme of allocating oyster beds to specific oyster fishers was successful
for many of the same reasons. See Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and
Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 521, 532-33 (1975).
188. James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality
in the Maine Lobster Industry, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 154, at 37.
189. Id. at 40.
190. Id. at 40-45.
191. See id. at 42.
192. See id. There are occasional violations of both kinds of areas. Such incursions often lead to the
destruction of the intruder's lobster traps and gear. Id. at 41.
193. Id. at 49
194. Id. at55.
195. Id. at 55-57.
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These solutions to commons problems are similar in two respects. First,
claims to resources are spread over time. That is, a person is guaranteed a
specified claim on the resource now and in the future."9 This overcomes the
problem of the surf clam, because now a person can leave a clam on the flat
and be assured that someone else will not take it. The resource's future value
to the harvester is no longer zero. The second commonality is that takers are
identifiable. The people clamming know who else is entitled to how many
clams, and are able to enforce that limitation. Thus the right is not only
extended over time but is also defensible.
C. The Programs Compared: Management Versus Protection
Southern African governments have attempted to enlist the virtues of
property regimes in their policies. Zimbabwean wildlife policy creates a
property right in wildlife. Rather than waiting until the elephant has been killed
to recognize possession, the government has recognized that a property interest
exists while the elephant is still alive. Thus a person who kills an elephant
after she has a vested property right is no longer taking it from the commons,
but rather is killing what is already hers. Because the property right protects
her ability to profit from the elephant in the future, she has a greater incentive
to protect it than the person who must kill the elephant immediately in order
to profit.
Zimbabwe identifies the community as the owner of the elephants.""
Because the community is entitled to exclude others from taking the elephants,
it will be able to capture the elephants' value now or in the future. The
property right allows the "owners" to determine which elephants it is
advantageous to kill for profit and which elephants they should preserve for
196. As long as the user of a fishery is sure that he will have property rights over the
fishery for a series of periods in the future. he can plan the use of the fishery in
such a way as to maximize the present value (future net returns discounted to the
present) of his enterprise. From the social point of view it can he said that he will
bring about the "best" use of the fishery ..
Scott, supra note 146, at 122.
This analysis assumes that owners of entitlements have confidence that the resource will not be
depleted despite the presence of a property system. If people believe that elephants will disappear soon
(because of poachers, say) then the owners will want to take their share as quickly as possible, before
someone else does. People generally have an incentive not to respect property nghts until everyone abides
by the property regime. For a discussion of this collective organization problem, see Carol M. Rose,
Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory Narrative Theory. Feminist 7heory. 2 YALE J.L
& HUMAN. 37, 48-53 (1990) (arguing that cooperation of otherwise individualistic actors is necessary to
create property-rights-based protections). One potential threat to secure property interests in Zimbabc is
the government's current land redistribution policy. See Neil Henry. Farm-Takeoser Plan Roils Zimbabwe.
WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 1991. at A6 (reporting Zimbabwe's plan to seize commereial farms for resettlement
by poor families). Such uncertainty will cause people to value future property nghts less and possibly
accelerate killing of elephants.
197. See supra part II.A.
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breeding or other purposes.' 98 Either way, the community shares the
proceeds. The community loses revenue only if it lets poachers steal the
elephants.
Community members can easily identify "owners" of the elephants because
anyone not a member of the community does not have an elephant entitlement.
The profit motive provides a strong incentive to prevent poaching, which is
essentially stealing from the community. In these communities, as in the harbor
gangs, no single person has rights to an elephant. A close-knit community
controls access to the resource.' 99 This effectively creates central ownership
and control. Because the communities generally share the wealth, there is little
incentive or opportunity for individual appropriation." °
The local management programs create incentives to preserve the elephant
population at a sustainable level. The Zimbabwean government provides
scientific advice on the appropriate number of elephant culls and supervises to
ensure that culls are not excessive. Zimbabwe focuses on guaranteeing the
survival of a certain and substantial number of elephants. 20' By sharing
profits from elephants with communities now and establishing community
rights to them in the future, Zimbabwe has reduced incentives to kill elephants.
South Africa, like Zimbabwe, has chosen to manage wildlife actively and
to use the proceeds to increase wildlife protection.2a Kruger National Park
funds itself with revenues from admissions fees and from the proceeds of
culling. The park's ability to profit directly from wildlife gives it an incentive
to manage its wildlife carefully. South Africa's approach also effectively
balances human and wildlife needs. Within the park, South Africa ensures that
humans cannot encroach upon wildlife,203 and the exclusion of human
settlement means that no local populations are threatened by the wildlife."
4
South Africa and Zimbabwe recognize the competition between elephants
and humans for land as well as the demands for the use of wildlife. Zimbabwe
198. If the elephant's "owner" has a future interest in the elephant, then that owner will consider not
just the elephant's ivory, but also its ability to produce more elephants. In the extreme, farming of elephants
solely for ivory and hides could occur. Assuming private ownership, only moral considerations would
preclude such a system. There is debate as to the optimal harvesting time for an elephant's tusks. Tusks
grow each year at an approximately constant rate, HARLAND, supra note 8, at 21, and thus are their largest
upon the elephant's death, Glennon, supra note 2, at 9.
199. See Child, supra note 62, at 61 ("The [community management] process is democratic, and the
opportunity for corruption is minimal because each member of the community is aware of who is
responsible for which monies.").
200. Id. ("When an animal is shot or photographed, the fees are put on the table as cash and the
community debates how to use it.").
201. The theory, as described by Zimbabwe's Rowan Martin, Director of Department of Parks and
Wild Life Management, is to use the available funds to protect as much wildlife as possible and to leave
the remaining wildlife to others. ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 4, at 171. Funding for wildlife protection
could be increased if the ivory from culling could be sold.
202. See Perlez, supra note 40, at C4 (calling Kruger National Park "highly managed animal
kingdom").
203. Id.
204. The park is amply fenced to keep animals in and poachers out. See id.
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relies upon a system of local management and property rights, while South
Africa has implemented effective centralized park management. Each country
has approached wildlife management from a similar perspective: They both
realize that people are willing to pay to benefit from wildlife. By allowing
groups in a position to control the resource to trade and to capture the profits,
South Africa and Zimbabwe have provided incentives to maintain wildlife
populations as well as to balance efficiently the clashing needs of wildlife and
people.
Kenya, in contrast to Zimbabwe and South Africa, has decided not to
allow its people to share in profits from wildlife,0 5 as local populations may
not profit from culling or hunting and generally receive very little of the tourist
revenue.' Those most affected by the elephant's destructive capacity have
few incentives to help keep the elephant alive. Furthermore, because trade in
wildlife is prohibited in Kenya, there is no source of funding, other than direct
government expenditures, to improve elephant protection. Kenya recognizes
this fact, but is ideologically opposed to the culling of elephants to derive
revenue.
207
D. Property Rights, Profits, and Protection
Rose posits that of the four regulatory mechanisms she describes, there is
no best solution for all occasions. 20 8 As pressure on the resource increases,
a more restrictive strategy will be more effective. The optimal regime is
determined by comparing costs across these four possibilities. Rose shows that
a property rights regime is preferable to a command-and-control regime once
the cost of the latter type of policy becomes excessive.2°
CITES, like other command-and-control policies, imposes enforcement
costs on those trying to protect the elephant.210 In Kenya, all citizens bear a
205. In some sense this is a distributional issue. Kenya has allocated the property right in wildlife
resources to its government. The government has outlawed all culling and determined that only the central
government may earn money from tourism revenue. In a truly democratic nation with efficient
administration and enforcement, this allocative choice would matter little. Individuals would "own- a share
of the elephant resources, held in trust by the government, and would benefit from the profits. They would
also be able to influence the government's trade policies.
206. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 136 (reporting little of tourist revenue in Kenya is returned to
communities in form of better services and infrastructure).
207. The principles underlying Kenya's position have been questioned. Compare Leakey. supra note
59, at 59 (noting that Leakey, Director of Kenya Wildlife Service, objects to culling on moral and practical
grounds) with BONNER, supra note 2, at 243 (noting that Leakey tacitly acknowledges potential substantial
value of allowing hunting).
208. See Rose, supra note 165, at 8-12. 37.
209. See id. at 24.
210. Command-and-control policies restrict methods of taking. See supra note 173 CITES simply
restricts the possible methods to none: One cannot take the resource at all. CITES increases the cost of
taking because one must run the risk of being caught with illegal goods or being killed by an antipoaching
patrol. Raising taking costs reduces the quantity taken, but antipoaching patrols have not sufficiently raised
the cost of ivory to sustain elephant populations.
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portion of these enforcement costs. In southern Africa, owners incur the costs
because they must protect their elephants to maintain their property rights.2"'
Because southern African strategies have better-defined property rights, they
encourage owners to reinvest funds earned from elephants back into
212environmental protection. In Zimbabwe, the costs of protection are
recouped through profits from trade. One who maintains a herd is rewarded
with additional valuable elephants.
Zimbabwe and Kenya illustrate the lessons learned from the various
commons problems. The typical outcome prior to property rights is an overuse
of the resource: The commons becomes depleted. Once a form of property
rights is instituted, owners know that they have a right to profit from the
resource in the future, and they become more interested in conserving. They
take less in the present because they know the resource will be there for them
in the future. So too with elephants: The right to profits in the future
encourages conservation in the present.
The effect of listing the elephant on CITES Appendix I is to eliminate the
ability to profit from managed culling. From the individual's and community's
perspectives, this is tantamount to returning the species to the global commons
where one cannot profit by husbanding a resource. Because individuals will
expect to receive few future profits from the elephant, the incentive to take
from the commons still exists, diminished only by the additional costs imposed
on poachers by enhanced enforcement of the ban. And enhanced enforcement
may be unaffordable, given the loss of funds previously earned from elephant
trade.
211. Kenya's total ban on the ivory trade may be viewed as an allocation of the property right to the
government, which in turn denies citizens the right to kill elephants. The two schemes, then, differ in
efficacy and management costs. Involving local populations in the patrols and giving them incentives to
work for elephant preservation will likely reduce costs. This is intuitively plausible because local
populations will not need to be paid if they are compensated for their efforts by appropriate incentives.
Dean Lueck notes that wildlife trade restrictions are often chosen as a response to the higher cost of
property rights enforcement, but that as property rights become stronger and better enforced, trade can more
safely be permitted. See Dean Lueck, The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 319
(1989). This has two implications for the elephant. First, a ban on trading (perhaps not universal, see infra
text accompanying notes 250-55) may be useful as a transitional remedy until property rights are better
defined and stabilized. If Kenya can develop a system like Zimbabwe's (with modifications to address local
needs) then trade might be resumed. Second, where property rights have been well defined, open trade may
be possible without the problems encountered in a system with ill- or under-defined property rights.
This explanation is insufficient to distinguish South Africa from Kenya, as both countries employ park
wardens to defend elephants from poachers. Wardens have an incentive to take bribes and to allow
poaching. This Note suggests in Part IV that corruption is less prevalent in South Africa than in Kenya
because democratic processes are more likely to provide incentives to prevent such corruption.
212. Property rights in elephants allow the value of an elephant to accrue to the owner, and thus create
incentives and resources to protect the entire species. Cf FAVRE, supra note 8, at 123 ("The net result (of
a ban] would be that the illegal takers of elephants would receive all the profits while the protectors of
elephants would receive no economic benefit."); Rose, supra note 165, at 36 (suggesting that sale of air
pollution entitlements can raise money to enforce environmental regulations).
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IV. ELEPHANTS AS A CORRUPTION PROBLEM
The Zimbabwean property rights system allows individuals to profit from
careful conservation of the elephant, thereby aligning individual incentives with
preservation of the species. Local property rights cannot, however, explain the
success of the South African system. Both South Africa and Kenya rely on
parks and wildlife agencies, rather than on the community and local property
rights, to protect their elephants. Although their policies appear similar, South
Africa has enjoyed great success in protecting its elephants while Kenya has
not. Kenya's program has been burdened by significant corruption in the
operation of its protection programs and antipoaching patrols, 2"3 a problem
southern African countries have not had.
Park rangers have the same incentives for exploiting the commons as
everyone else. This is as true in South Africa as in Kenya. Each warden will
seek to collect her share of bribes before fellow rangers allow the last elephant
to be killed. Absent enforcement, no one has an incentive to refuse a bribe and
thereby to conserve the resource, because some other ranger will take the bribe
instead. Insufficient supervision of park wardens or their superiors'
unwillingness to enforce rules (because of bribes214 or a lack of information)
enables wardens to take bribes more easily. In such a regime, the allocation of
the resource to the government becomes an allocation to the park rangers who
reap most of the profits from wildlife, and thus the benefits of wildlife do not
redound to the citizens of the nation. Absent a proper alignment of warden
incentives with citizen preferences, a system to limit opportunities to bribe
wardens will be necessary.
Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that competitive elections may reduce
corruption in a political system.1 5 The government of Kenya has been a
dictatorship in recent years. The southern African countries, in contrast, do
have at least nominally democratic political systems.216 These political
differences may affect incentives of wardens to protect elephants, and may
therefore partially explain the successes of South Africa and the failures of
Kenya.
Kenya has been a one-party state since 1969;217 the ruling party's status
was constitutionally enshrined in 1982.2 " Kenyan President Moi was
213. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text: see also Andrei Shleifer & Robcrt W Vishny.
Corruption, 108 QJ. ECON. 599, 599 (1993) (defining "'government corruption" as "the sale by government
officials of government property for personal gain").
214. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 173-74 (1978)
215. Id. at 213.
216. BONNER, supra note 2, at 137-38.
217. THECOMMONWEALTH YEARBOOK 1992, at 231 (1992) lhereinafterCO. IOwEALTll; POLtMCAL
HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1993, at 433 (Arthur S. Banks ed.. 1993) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]
218. HANDBOOK, supra note 217. at 433; 2 THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1993. at 1646 (34th
ed. 1993) [hereinafter EUROPA].
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reelected unopposed in 1979, 1983, and 1988.219 Suppression of political
dissidents" as well as press censorship"' occurred in the 1980's. One
report notes that "the political system allows [government officials] to indulge
in trade and purchase property without let or hindrance." '222 Kenya is, by
most standards, undemocratic.
South Africa, despite the exclusion of nonwhites from government until
1994, has had electoral competition in recent years. In 1987 the majority party
received 52.7% of total votes, and in 1989, only 48.6%.223 Of the 166 seats
in Parliament, the majority held 93 and the two opposition parties held a total
of 72.24 The press is described as "extremely vigorous, ' '225 although it was
subject to censorship while South Africa was in a state of emergency in the
late 1980's.226 Although South African "democracy" has not, until recently,
allowed nonwhites access to the political process, there generally has been
more competition for power and a greater degree of media scrutiny of
government in South Africa than in Kenya.
Dictatorships reduce government accountability to citizens. The lack of
electoral competition often allows government officials to ignore public
opinion. Officials in an undemocratic government may more easily seek to
increase their wealth227 at the expense of the nation's citizens. In Kenya,
warden-agents fail to act on behalf of their citizen-principals because they are
not held accountable by democratically elected officials.22 Although the
government of Kenya is supposedly managing national wildlife for the benefit
of its citizens, its lack of accountability allows officials to pursue other goals,
goals that may be detrimental to the survival of elephants.22 9 In contrast, a
government that has potential challengers is forced to address the desires of its
citizens in order to remain in power.230 Thus its officials will pursue a
strategy that accords more closely with the preferences of its citizens.23'
219. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 217, at 231.
220. 2 EUROPA, supra note 218, at 1646; see also 21 AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD B325 (Marion
E. Doro ed., 1992) [hereinafter ACR].
221. 21 ACR, supra note 220, at B330.
222. 21 id. at B327.
223. 2 EUROPA, supra note 218, at 2568; see also 21 ACR, supra note 220, at B653.
224. 2 EUROPA, supra note 218, at 2581.
225. 2 id. at 2583.
226. Id.
227. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 214, at 231.
228. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 704 (1984) ("It is supposed, not unreasonably, that perceptions
of political advantage by the accountable officeholder will often coincide with what is the public good. For
a bribe there is no accountability but to the briber."); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 213, at 601 ("Corrupt
officials go unpunished because their bosses often share in the proceeds and because public pressure to stop
corruption in most countries is weak.").
229. See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 44 (1988) (arguing that when corruption
becomes possible, "[o]fficials spend an increasing amount of their time looking for ways to secure bribes
and extort payments, rather than exerting themselves in fulfillment of their public duties").
230. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 214, at 231-32.
231. Id. at 231.
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South Africa's officials are more likely to manage elephants in the public
interest because they have been challenged for reelection and are therefore
more accountable to the desires of citizens.
Because Kenya's dictatorship allows corruption, and because corruption
allows park rangers to act on their own behalf, Kenya's poaching problem has
been exacerbated. 2  The gains from elephant killings are captured by park
wardens instead of citizens. This stands in contrast to South Africa, where a
more responsive government gives the electorate as a whole a say in how its
elephant asset should be managed. Because democratic governments that
tolerate corrupt rangers can be voted out of power, they have an incentive to
prevent bribe taking in order to remain in power. 3
In South Africa, electoral competition aligns incentives so that the
government returns the value of the elephant to the entire nation in the form
of improved parks and abundant wildlife. Furthermore, South Africa, unlike
Kenya, earned revenue from elephants by selling ivory and hides, thus
increasing the total return, and thereby making even more important the fact
that its system effectively returned the profits to the people. The South African
system gives all citizens an incentive to preserve elephants because everyone
stands to gain when elephants are saved from poachers. Because South
Africa's government faces competition for reelection, it supervises its wardens
more carefully than does Kenya. This reduces corruption and increases the
wealth returned to citizens. Because South Africa allows culling and trade in
elephants, the amount of money that it earns is significant enough to help
protect elephants and to interest the population in the effective management of
the resource. By allowing tangible benefits to accrue to citizens, South Africa
reduces incentives for killing elephants inefficiently. Like Zimbabwe, the entire
232. A fully effective dictator would manage the natural resources well. Her incentives would be to
maximize profits, like a private owner, by conserving elephants so that they will regenerate. This. of course,
involves eliminating corruption within her government. The dictator's efforts to climinate inimical
corruption probably would be stymied by high monitoring costs. See KIrTGAARD. supra note 229. at 70-71
("The principal's problem grows difficult when ... he has poor information about the agent's activities.
either productive or corrupt."); see also ROSE-ACKERUAN. supra note 214. at 198-99 (noting that unlike
company stockholders, voter-citizens cannot sell their shares in the country); Edward C. Banficld.
Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & ECON. 587. 598 (1975) ("Unlike the
shareholder, the citizen cannot easily disassociate himself from a corrupt organization; to escape it he must
incur the costs of moving to another city, state, or country.").
Monitoring costs include the direct costs of monitoring as well as costs to morale from signs of the
principal's mistrust. Thus it is sometimes more costly to stop corruption than to allow it. Banfield. supra,
at 590. A dictator may not use the resource efficiently for other reasons as well. If she fears being
overthrown she may liquidate the resource quickly while it is still under her control.
233. Another method of curing this agency-corruption problem may be to privauze. In a pnvatized
scheme, managers will seek to reduce corruption to the extent that it consists of taking (but not necessarily
making) bribes. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 214. at 191. Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program creates a form
of property rights in elephants, and in that sense privatizes the animals. Because the owners are the people
who directly benefit from successful management, they will have greatly reduced incentives to take bribes.
Roger Cohn, Zambia: The People's War on Poaching. AUDUBON. Mar.-Apr. 1994. at 70. 76 (reporting
Zambian tribal chief and former poacher who changed his ways once he was given incentive to retain
wildlife).
The Yale Law Journal
South African community has a stake in preservation because its members
stand to profit. Kenyans, in contrast, can gain from elephants only by killing
them illegally, and therefore have no incentives to provide protection.
V. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF OTHER BANS ON WILDLIFE TRADING
Part III argued that the CITES ban on ivory trade has prevented
Zimbabwe, and other countries using active management policies, from
realizing the full benefit of their wildlife policies. The trade ban forces
Zimbabwe to forgo vital revenue that it could use to support its protection
programs. This Part analyzes the ivory trade ban in light of other bans on
wildlife trade. Both the rhinoceros and the leopard have been listed on
Appendix I because of their rapidly diminishing numbers. The result of each
ban has been quite different, however. The leopard population has stabilized,
while the rhinoceros population has continued to plummet. The evidence from
these other bans suggests that reliance on the Appendix I complete trade ban
for the elephant's protection may be unnecessary or detrimental.
The black rhinoceros population declined from 60,000 in 1970 to an
estimated 2000 in 1992.234 The horn of the rhino is the prized item, used for
dagger handles in Yemen and ground into medicinal products for consumption
in China. 1 5 The price of hom was $13,000 per pound in 1988, and is thus
considerably more valuable than ivory. 6 Despite the ban, rhinoceros horn
has made it onto the black market and thus the poaching continues.237 The
official trade ban has frustrated active management policies like Zimbabwe's.
One estimate suggests that the fee for hunting a single rhino could approach
$100,000.'$ Such amounts would persuade locals to help protect rhinos from
poachers if they had some stake in future profits, but the Appendix I listing
eliminates local incentives to preserve the rhino. One rancher in Zimbabwe
spends $22,500 to protect his seven rhinos each year.39 He earns money
from tourists, and could support his ranch's protection costs for over four years
by allowing just one rhino to be hunted. The ban, however, significantly
reduces the value of rhino "assets." Thus the Appendix I trade ban on rhino
234. Bill Keller, Save the Rhinos Safari: Some Say Hunting Could Protect Endangered Species, S.F.
CHRON., Jan 10, 1993 (Sunday Punch Section), at 4. There are five species of rhinoceros, two of which
live in Africa. The black rhinoceros is the most sought after; of the two subspecies of white rhinoceros,
the northern white rhinoceros is almost completely extinct; and the southern white rhinoceros has recovered
substantially over the past 15 years. FrrZGERALD, supra note 171, at 106-07.
235. Keller, supra note 234, at 4.
236. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 26 (citing Jeffrey P. Cohn, Halting the Rhino's Demise, 38
BioSciENcE 740 (1988)); Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 61, at D3 (rhino hom $8000 per pound in 1989);
see also supra note 59 (ivory prices).
237. Glennon suggests that the comparison of rhinoceros horn to elephant tusks is inapposite, because
the small size of the horn and its use in powdered form allows it to be surreptitiously transported more
easily than elephant tusks. Glennon, supra note 2, at 26.
238. Keller, supra note 234, at 4.
239. See Fumbi, Under Guard, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1994, at 50.
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products has failed to stop poaching or to halt the decline in the rhinoceros
population.
Michael Glennon contends, however, that a trade ban has been more
effective in protecting the leopard. The leopard was listed on Appendix I to
help stop the trade in its furs. Although it is unclear that the leopard was ever
truly endangered,2 ° the ban is credited with having sustained the
population. 21 As a result of the initial success of the ban, the international
community has reopened limited trade in leopard skins under a "special quota
system" arranged through CiTES 4 2 Each country may export a self-
determined quota, "based on the status of [its] particular leopard
population[]." 2" The skins may not be intended for resale and each importer
is only allowed one skin per year, thereby limiting the development of a
sizable commercial trade.2" The quota system requires tagging and
numbering each skin, as well as annual reports to CITES. 45 This allows
strict monitoring of the trade so that countries are less able to cheat on their
obligation to protect.
The leopard trade system is a compromise designed to recognize that
leopards are not equally endangered in all countries.246 Because a trophy hunt
for a single leopard can reap up to $10,000,247 the species provides a
potentially lucrative source of funds for additional wildlife protection. The
trade system allows countries with stable leopard populations to treat the
leopard as a "renewable resource, '248 while other countries continue to
provide the necessary protection for the species, assisted by strict international
control of trade.
The leopard analogy is perhaps even more apposite than Glennon
acknowledges. The trade system developed for the leopard acknowledges the
differing needs and capabilities that various nations have for protecting
wildlife. It rewards those that have protected the leopard, allowing them to
profit from it, and to reinvest the funds in wildlife protection. Meanwhile,
those countries in which the leopard is more threatened are able to rely on
reasonably effective controls on trade to protect their leopards.
One significant distinction between the cases of the elephant, rhinoceros,
and leopard is the ease with which the products are concealed during
transportation. A rhino horn can be ground up, and is generally smaller than
240. FITZGERALD, supra note 171. at 45. The leopard population is "hotly debated." but one report
estimates that it exceeds 70,000. Id.
241. See Glennon, supra note 2. at 26 n.219.
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a tusk.249 In comparison, a leopard skin is even more recognizable and
sizable than cut ivory. Thus, policing trade in leopard skins may be even easier
than policing trade in tusks. Ivory, therefore, probably lies somewhere between
the case of the leopard skins and that of the rhino horn in terms of
enforceability of a trade ban.
An essential component of the leopard skin system is the strict monitoring
of trade flows. Developments in technology will soon allow similar
identification of elephant tusks to determine their geographical origin."
Unfortunately, the cost may be high, perhaps $200 per tusk, and thus may not
provide much help." A reduction in cost, however, would allow ivory from
countries with stable elephant populations to be separated from those with
declining populations. Such a system might allow a return to a form of
regulated trade like the IEQS, which some contend was never given a real
chance to work.5
2
In 1992, several southern African nations formed the Southern Africa
Center for Ivory Marketing (SACIM).5 3 The idea was to create a realistic
method of reopening trade in ivory on a limited, strictly regulated basis.
SACIM requires that ivory be sold only to approved and registered carvers;
that there will be no imports of raw ivory to SACIM countries; and that all
profits go directly to elephant conservation.5 4 The critical component of
SACIM is a plan to "tag" tusks with a hologram, bar code, and serial
number5 '5 The combination of these policies would allow SACIM to
guarantee that the ivory was taken only from countries whose elephant
populations were thriving. It would therefore allow some countries to resume
profiting, while enabling the countries with endangered elephant populations
to continue their protection.
The success of the system for regulating the leopard trade suggests that it
is possible to design a flexible international trade ban. The system recognizes
that some countries are more successful than others at preserving the species,
and rewards those countries with more effective preservation systems. It also
supports the proposition that trade, if properly managed and monitored, will
not necessarily lead to the extinction of a species. Instead such trade can
benefit everyone: consumers, local populations, and most important, the
species.
249. See supra text accompanying note 237.
250. See, e.g., Concar & Cole, supra note 4, at 32 (discussing development of isotopic analysis of
ivory to determine geographic origin); Nicholas Georgiadis, Fingerprinting Ivory, WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 72, 72-73 (discussing progress toward using genetic differences across
regions to determine ivory's origin).
251. Concar & Cole, supra note 4, at 32. But see Glennon, supra note 2, at 39 (noting existence of
inexpensive marking system).
252. See BONNER, supra note 2, at 143.
253. Ricciuti, supra note 1. at 30.
254. Id.
255. Cole, supra note 120, at 7.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that a scheme of active management and property
rights more effectively creates incentives to preserve a species than does a
rigid ban on all trade in the species. The success of active management in
southern Africa has resulted in the growth of elephant populations. By
allowing local people to share in the profits from elephants, the active
management systems give people a reason to protect the elephant. The policy
has the effect of removing the elephant from the commons and allocating
present and future rights to profit from it to the people. As numerous
commentators have shown, similar solutions ameliorate the problem of
overconsumption associated with other common resources.
International law, through CITES, has frustrated this goal by eliminating
owners' incentives to protect elephants as their own property. The movement
of the elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I has removed the legal ability
to profit from elephants, and hence diminished the incentives to protect them.
The change has forced all of Africa to adopt a protective system that has failed
to protect elephants in the countries previously using it. The protective
management system reduces citizens' incentive to preserve the elephant species
because it reduces their ability to profit from it. Furthermore, corruption in
Kenya keeps the few profits that are earned from tourism from being passed
through to the average citizen.
Although active species management often involves culling, protective
management coincides with an increase in the number of elephants killed by
poachers. Culling is superior to illegal poaching because the money earned
from the ivory assists other elephants, rather than lining poachers' pockets.2
If elephants must die-and ivory demand and expanding human populations
have heretofore dictated that they will-active management ensures that their
deaths will help to preserve the elephant species. If the CITES complete trade
ban produces the same results as the trade ban in Kenya, local populations may
256. Culling may also be preferable because of its effects on the elephants themselves. A cull usually
targets an entire herd, typically 30-40 elephants, thereby spanng individual elephants the trauma of
experiencing the death of other elephants in the herd. See Ricctut. suipra note I. at 28 (If calves or
females are knocked out of a population, the trauma suffered by the survivors disrupts their social structure
and affects their ultimate survival. Poaching has had the same result. Elephants seem to experience distress
when other elephants die and have been seen touching, even fondling, the remains."-. In contrast to culling.
a poacher is likely to target only some elephants in each herd. while hitting many herds, leaving the young
to suffer without their parents. A poacher earlier this century "was more ruthless and undiscrminating than
the man hunting under license. He could not afford to be scrupulous about immature and cow elephants:
any beast that carried ivory was his prey." WILSON & AYERsT. supra note 8. at 140 Similarly, today a
poacher is unlikely to choose elephants whose loss will mean the least to the herd. but instead is likely to
target only the oldest, tuskiest, male elephants whose ivory is most valuable. See HARLAND. supra note 8.
at 21-22. Scientifically managed culling reduces this problem by allowing a proper age and sex disibution
to be maintained. See Karen Barnes & Richard Barnes. A Lost Generation. WILDUFE CONSERVATION.
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 70, 71 (noting negative future effects of poaching's decimation of specific age group
of elephants).
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again resent animals that compete with them for resources and from which
they cannot profit. Until the efficacy of protective management programs
improves, banning trade in ivory will remain an unfortunate international
policy.
